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Security modelRecent initiatives that evaluate the security of physical systems with objects as assets and
people as agents – here calledsocio-technical physical systems – have limitations: their agent
behavior is too simple, they just estimate feasibility and not the likelihood of attacks, or
they do estimate likelihood but on explicitly provided attacks only. We propose a model
that can detect and quantify attacks. It has a rich set of agent actions with associated
probability and cost. We also propose a threat model, an intruder that can misbehave
and that competes with honest agents. The intruder’s actions have an associated cost
and are constrained to be realistic. We map our model to a probabilistic symbolic model
checker and we express templates of security properties in the Probabilistic
Computation Tree Logic, thus supporting automatic analysis of security properties. A use
case shows the effectiveness of our approach.
 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Surely anyone raises an eyebrow when reading about simple yet canny social engineering attacks like the one ﬁrst
reported in [1] and recently recalled by Schneier in his blog [2]. Without having the key and without breaching the door,
an intruder stole a conﬁdential document from a supposed-to-be locked room. This was possible because someone executed
what the intruder’s note requested: ‘please leave the door unlocked’. Actually, the full attack requires some preparatory
steps: entering the building during ofﬁce hours, surreptitiously sticking the message on the door, and re-entering the ofﬁce
space after everyone has left. But all these actions seem less critical than entering a locked door without holding the key. This
attack is an example of an intrusion that exploits vulnerabilities in a physical space. It was also possible because it was tol-
erated that secret reports are left accessible inside the room, optimistically assuming that a locked door was a sufﬁcient pro-
tection. This is clearly a deﬁciency at the level of security policies.
Organizations should be concerned about checking the security of their policies that protect their assets, and the mecha-
nisms guarding the access to the ofﬁces should back-up the policies. But checking the effective security of a place is far from
being simple. The elements of the game are people, objects which can be moved or stolen and locations that can be locked/
unlocked under speciﬁc conditions. We call a system with such elements a socio-technical physical system (STPS). This term
reminds Whitworth and Ahmad’s Socio-Technical System [3], which they introduced to describe models about societal and
psychological aspects in human computer interactions and problems like mistrust, unfairness and injustice. We consider out, http://
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stress that the kind of interactions we look at are those with the physical environments.
We sustain that studying the security underneath STPSs, requires methodologies of analysis as reliable as those developed
for the analysis of security protocols (e.g., see [4–6]). Apparent diversities between the two domains, the technical vs. the
socio-technical, suggest that the socio-technical security analysis is trickier. Socio-technical systems are made not only of
software processes, digital messages and communication channels, but also of people, of physical objects and localities,
and of communications that may happen via non-conventional media, such as hand-to-hand, visual, and auditory channels.
Despite the increasing interest in the subject, to understand whether formal techniques can help automate the security
analysis of STPSs is still on-going research. There is scarcity of tools to ﬁgure out whether and how, at what cost and with
what probability, an intruder can gain unauthorized access to resources.
Contributions. In this paper, we initiate to develop such an analysis tool. We propose a formalism to model basic elements
of STPSs, namely locations, people, and objects. Our formalism contains a rich set of user actions, such as changing locations,
manipulating and exchanging objects, locking and unlocking doors and containers. We let actions have a cost and agents act
either non-deterministically or probabilistically; actions can be guarded by contextual conditions. We also propose a model
of the intruder, as a particular agent able to act maliciously, but according to realistic abilities which it exerts constrainedly
depending on physical spaces and costs.
For security analysis, we propose model checking [7,8] to ensure security in STPSs. We deﬁne a mapping from STPS mod-
els, expressed in the proposed formalism, to the input language of the probabilistic symbolic model checker PRISM [9]. We
express security properties in the extended probabilistic computational tree logic (PCTL) [10] and, to overcome the downside
of the user-unfriendliness of the logic in expressing natural language security statements, we propose templates for relevant
security properties.
Outline. In Section 2 we review the related work. Section 3 describes the formalism that models STPSs and Section 4
details our approach towards security analysis. Experimental results are showed in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes
the paper and sketches the future directions.2. Related work
In this section we survey the most recent initiatives that deal with modeling, formalizing, and analyzing security in STPSs.
Sommestad et al. [11] propose a tool for the analysis of vulnerabilities in computer systems of large organizations and
enterprises. The tool, called Cyber-Security Modeling Language (CySeMoL), uses a probabilistic relational model and esti-
mates the probability of success of known attacks which, by experience, are expected to happen. The tool inputs a meta-
model of the system, with potential attacks and countermeasures, and estimated attack probabilities of single components.
The tool is meant for risk analysis of cyber-security threats, but it is not meant to discover new attacks.
Gunnarsson [12], and Probst and Hansen [13,14] analyze the robustness of control policies ruling access to an organiza-
tion’s building and its IT network. The analysis highlights what credentials an actor needs in order to reach speciﬁc locations
and to access speciﬁc data. It also shows what he could reach if he had speciﬁc credentials. Actors can move within the
infrastructure and access the resources therein. The system is modeled in ‘‘acKlaim’’, a calculus of the Klaim family [15],
and the analysis consists of a reachability check on locations and actions. This approach is further extended by Probst
et al. [16] with, amongst others, capabilities and restrictions, allowing an analysis of static and dynamic properties of the
system and of the behavior of actors. Dimkov, Pieters and Hartel [17] also present a dialect of acKlaim, called Portunes.
They describe attacks across digital, physical and social security alignments. The attacks are generated by searching through
actions and preconditions allowed in the organization. Portunes treats people as physical elements that can do physical
actions and are assailable to physical attacks.
The models for the infrastructure and for the actors in [12–14,16,17] have been of inspiration for the model we propose in
this paper. But differently, we introduce costs and probabilities. We assume that not all possible attacks are necessarily fea-
sible: they in fact have costs of execution and probability of success, which are qualities that depend on factors such as time
to move from one place to another, effort to act one way instead of another. Our analysis is thus quantitative, making our
security properties more interesting because they are expressed in relation to costs and probabilities.
Algarni et al. [18] propose a social engineering schema to describe threats in social networks. The schema covers the
environment, the attacker, the trick, and the victims. The environment includes privacy settings, friendship and connections,
and the content of user proﬁles. The attacker has been characterised by its ability to understand the victim, and to develop
and perform an attack plan. A trick has been identiﬁed by the quality of the attack plan and its suitability to the targeted. The
victim user supports socio-psychological factors, personality types, demographics variables, and motivations and drives.
Doss and Tejay [19] conduct a study by observing a group of security analysts who detect insider attacks. The goal is to
determine how security analysts can use current security detection tools such as log analysis tools and intrusion detection
systems to detect insider attacks. This study was conducted based upon the situational research approach from Grounded
Theory.1 Following GT, four categories were created: security monitoring, threat assessment, insider evaluation and goal1 Grounded Theory (GT) is a systematic methodology in the social sciences involving the discovery of theory through the analysis of data.
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backgrounds can be combined to create an analytical model for detecting insider threats.
To anticipate insider attacks, Greitzer and Hohimer [20] provide a predictive framework that models human behaviors. It
integrates cyber data sources, and psychological and motivational factors. The framework adopts functional requirements
inspired from the neocortex metaphor. The factors are captured in a hierarchical ontology to interpret employee role, psy-
cho-social, policy violation, and web access patterns.
The limitation of the approaches [18–20] is that they do not provide any formalization or experimental results. They focus
on the high-level strategies for modeling and analyzing security in STPSs.
Meadows and Pavlovic [21] propose a logic framework to reason about permitted and required movements in a physical
space, which can be used to analyze security procedures that govern the movement of people. Their procedures deﬁne
humans controlling hierarchical conﬁgurations of physical objects, such as those that arise when we travel, packing our lug-
gage, tickets and documents to satisfy complex security and safety requirements. They propose a logic to analyze the pro-
cedures, which they use to show the failure of the shoe-screening policy at airports in preventing people to bring disallowed
objects in the security area. Compared to our work, this framework is limited to a qualitative speciﬁcation. Further, we use
templates of the temporal logic to express security policies.
Paja et al. [22] propose a high-level modeling language for STPSs called STS-ml. It is based on UML diagrams that support
social, information, and authorization views. Security requirements are generated based on the security needs between sen-
der and requester actors in terms of constraints. The security analysis uses a disjunctive Datalog solver to identify the con-
ﬂicting authorisations and the violation of security requirements. This work focuses only on four predeﬁned requirements.
Compared to our approach, none of the commented work covers the probability and costs of actions, formalizes STPS, and
measure their security level. Moreover, our security analysis is automatic: we use probabilistic model checking and take
advantage from the algorithms built within the tool we use.
3. Formalization
We envisage an STPS as a physical space (e.g., a building) with objects and people. The space is structured in locations
(e.g., rooms) accessible via lockable doors. People act in such a space. They lock or unlock doors, enter and exit rooms,
manipulate and exchange objects. Each action happens non-deterministically, conditionally, or probabilistically. Executing
an action has a cost. In the same space, a malicious entity threatens people’s normal workﬂow.
3.1. STPS: Formal model
A socio-technical physical system S 2 S is a tuple S ¼ hPhy;Obj;Act; Struci. Phy models the space, Obj models objects, Act
the actors including the intruder. Struc is a hierarchical structure that describes the relations that exist between the entities
of an STPS. This structure describes locations that belong to the building, the doors that connect two locations, the location of
actors and objects, and further, the objects that an object contains or that an actor holds.
Physical space. Phy is a building’s infrastructure, its locations and the doors connecting these. It relates keys to the doors
and tells if a door is locked or not. Formally, Phy is a tuple hL;D; keyD; lockedDi, where:
 L is a ﬁnite set of locations (with elements l; l0, etc. ).
 D is a ﬁnite set of doors (with elements d; d0, etc. ).
 keyD : D# O is a partial function that returns the object (i.e., the key) that can lock/unlock a door. keyD is deﬁned only on
doors that can be locked (objects are deﬁned in the next paragraph) .
 lockedD is a predicate. It is true when a door is locked and false when a door is unlocked.
Objects. An object can be a container (e.g., a safe) and containers are lockable. An object, container or not, can be movable,
destroyable, or both. Formally, Obj is a tuple hO; attr; keyO; lockedOi, where:
 O is a ﬁnite set of objects (with elements o; o0, etc. ).
 attr : O! 2fc;m;dg returns the set of attributes of an object, which is a subset of fc;m; dg. Here c stands for be a container,m
for being movable, and d for being destroyable.
 keyO : O# O is a partial function that returns the object (i.e., the key) that can lock/unlock an object. keyO is deﬁned only
on objects that are containers which can be locked.
 lockedO is a predicate saying whether an object is locked or not.
Actors. Actors have a behavior which is constructed from basic actions, composed sequentially or by non-deterministic,
conditional, or probabilistic choice. We identify one special actor I as the intruder. The main difference between a regular
actor and the intruder is that the intruder’s behavior is not restricted by a behavioral speciﬁcation. Actors’ locations, their
possessions, the cost of executing actions and the intruder’s capabilities are deﬁned later. Formally, Act is a tuple
hA; I;R; bvi where:Please cite this article in press as: Lenzini G et al. Security analysis of socio-technical physical systems. Comput Electr Eng (2015), http://
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 I R A is the intruder. We use AI as a shorthand for the set A [ fIg.
 The ﬁnite set of basic actions R is deﬁned as follows:
R ¼ MoveToðd; l; l0Þ; Lockðd; oÞ; UnLockðd; oÞ; Lockðo; o0Þ; UnLockðo; o0Þ; Putðo; lÞ; Getðo; lÞ; Putðo; o0Þ; Getðo; o0Þ; DestroyðoÞ;
Giveðo; aÞ; Recðo; aÞ : l; l0 2 L and d 2 D and o; o0 2 O and a 2 Ag
Informally, ‘‘MoveTo’’ means moving through a door from one location to another. ‘‘Lock’’ (resp., ‘‘UnLock’’) means locking
(resp., unlocking) a door or a container with a key. ‘‘Get’’ (resp., ‘‘Put’’) expresses picking an object up from (resp., putting
it down in) a container or a location. ‘‘Destroy’’ stands for destroying an object, and ‘‘Give’’ and ‘‘Rec’’ for giving and receiving
objects between agents.
 bvA : A!L returns the expression that describes the behavior of an actor.
L, the language of an actor’s behavioral expressions, is generated by the following Backus-Naur rule:
B< ¼ Stop j a  B j Bþ B j BþgB j BþpB, where a is an atomic action in R.
Informally, an actor’s behavior is built up starting from the basic actions and from a special action Stop, expressing inac-
tion. Composite actions are built by sequential composition ‘‘.’’, non-deterministic choice ‘‘+’’, probabilistic choice ‘‘þp’’ (here,
p is a probability value), and guarded choice ‘‘þg ’’. To simplify the semantical descriptions below, we will assume an equiva-
lence relation on behavioral expressions, satisfying at least the following equalities:
B1 þ B2 ¼ B2 þ B1;B1þgB2 ¼ B2þ:gB1, and B1þpB2 ¼ B2þ1pB1.
The guard g is a contextual condition, questioning, for instance, whether an agent possesses the right key, whether a door
is unlocked, or whether an object is movable. Formally, a guard is an expression e in the propositional logic language E
deﬁned as follows:Please
dx.doie< ¼ > j prop j :e j e ^ e
prop< ¼ d 2 connðl; l0Þjo 2 keyDðdÞjlockedDðdÞjlocOðoÞ ¼ ljc 2 attrðoÞjm 2 attrðoÞj
d 2 attrðoÞjo 2 contOðo0Þjo 2 keyOðo0ÞjlockedOðoÞjlocAðaÞ ¼ ljo 2 contAðaÞHere, ‘‘>’’ is the boolean value ‘true’, ‘^’ is conjunction, and ‘:’ is negation. The proposition d 2 connðl; l0Þ means a door con-
nects l and l0; locOðoÞ ¼ l and locAðaÞ ¼ l consider l as a location for o and a, respectively. o 2 contOðo0Þ and o 2 contAðaÞ show if
the object o is in a container o0 or possessed by a.
Structure. The structure describes the hierarchical relations between locations, objects, actors, and the intruder. It links
locations by doors, actors to locations, and objects to locations, to an object (the container), an actor or the intruder. The
structure takes the form of a tree extended with special edges deﬁning the connections between locations by doors.
Formally, Struc is a graph hV ; E;Ci, where:
 V ¼ fbg [ L [ AI [ O is the set of vertices, where b is the root that denotes the name of the building.
 hV ; Ei is a directed tree with a root node b, satisfying: E# ðfbg  LÞ [ ðL ðAI [ OÞÞ [ ðO OÞ.
 C# L D L is a set of undirected edges between locations, labeled by doors in D.
We formalize the satisﬁability of the guard g for S 2 S by the function sEtS ! B, which evaluates an expression e 2 E in S.
Table 1 describes the semantics of the atomic propositions in g. We use S as superscript to describe any function, predicate,
or element from S, and we denote by Eþ the transitive closure of the set of edges E. Eþ is the smallest set containing E, satisfy-
ing: if ðu;vÞ 2 Eþ and ðv;wÞ 2 Eþ, then ðu;wÞ 2 Eþ.3.2. Labeled transition system
We model the evolution of an STPS by means of a labeled state transition system hS; S0;)i. Here, S is the set of all STPS
states, S0 2 S is a given state that we call the initial state, and for a set of labels C,) # ðS C SÞ is the transition relation.Table 1
Semantics of guard expressions.
s>tS  true slockedOðoÞtS  lockedSOðoÞ
s:etS  :setS sx 2 attrðoÞtS  x 2 attrSðoÞ for x 2 c;m; df g
se ^ e0tS  setS ^ se0tS so0 2 contOðoÞtS  ðo; o0Þ 2 ðESÞ
þ
sd 2 connðl; l0ÞtS  ðl;d; l0Þ 2 CS so 2 contAðaÞtS  ða; oÞ 2 ðESÞ
þ
so 2 keyDðdÞtS  o ¼ keySDðdÞ slocOðoÞ ¼ ltS  ðl; oÞ 2 ðESÞ
þ
so 2 keyOðo0ÞtS  o ¼ keySOðo0Þ slocAðaÞ ¼ ltS  ðl; aÞ 2 ES
slockedDðdÞtS  lockedSDðdÞ
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.org/10.1016/j.compeleceng.2015.02.019
G. Lenzini et al. / Computers and Electrical Engineering xxx (2015) xxx–xxx 5Labels. Labels are tuples of the form C#R‘  Rþ  ½0;1, where R‘ are transition names, Rþ are costs, and [0,1] are proba-
bility values. The names in R‘ carry the action being executed, the actor (possibly the intruder) as well as the objects and
subjects of the action.Please
dx.doiR‘ ¼ movingxðd; l; l0Þ; lockingxðd; oÞ; unlockingxðd; oÞ; lockingxðo; o0Þ;unlockingxðo; o0Þ; droppingxðo; lÞ; graspingxðo; lÞ;

placingxðo; o0Þ;withdrawingxðo; o0Þ;destroyingxðoÞ; givingxða; oÞ; takingxða; oÞ; exchangingxða; a0; oÞ; stealingxða; oÞ;
slippingxða; oÞ; lockpickingxðlÞ; lockpickingxðoÞjl; l0 2 L and d 2 D and o; o0 2 O and a 2 A and x 2 AI
The real values in Rþ denote the cost of the transition. We assume that costs are established by a function Cost : R‘ ! Rþ.
Costs depend on all the elements of the transition: the action, the action’s subject and its object. So, for instance, the cost
of an actor moving from one location to another depends (or may depend) on the actor and on the two locations. In particu-
lar, the cost of the intruder opening a door with a key may be different from the cost of opening the door by picking the lock.
The probabilistic values denote the probability of the transition.
Transition relation. The transition relation ) deﬁnes how STPS states change in consequence of what the actors and the
intruder do. It is the smallest relation that satisﬁes the transition rules given in the reminder of this paragraph. We write
each transition in its inﬁx form S )ð‘;c;pÞ S0, where the states are represented by the relevant part of their graphs. The edge labels
and the nodes in the graphs express elements of the state that relate to them. We display only those elements that express a
condition for the occurrence of the transition or that change due to the transition. Besides, we often simplify the transition
label. We omit the cost c, as it is Costð‘Þ and can be easily retrieved when it evaluates to true, and we omit the probability
value when this is 1. This simpliﬁcation regards all rules, except those expressing guarded (GC) and probabilistic (PC)
choices. We present the transition rules of actors in Tables 2–4, and we describe the rules of the intruder in Table 5.
Actors. Table 2 shows the transition rules that describe the actions of an actor. Rule (M) describes an actor a moving from
location l to a connected location l0 via an unlocked door d. Rule (LD) concerns locking and (UD) concerns unlocking a door d
with the key k. Rule (LO) describes the locking and (UO) unlocking of a container.
Table 3 shows how an STPS changes because of an actor dropping an object o in the location where he stands (PL), or
putting it inside another container which is within the actor’s grasp (PO). Symmetrically, rules GO and GL describe the action
of picking an object up from an unlocked container or a location, respectively. Rule D describes how the STPS changes after
an actor destroys an object. The exchanging rule (EX) expresses synchronization of giving and receiving an object o. As a
result, the object becomes possession of the receiving party. In speciﬁcations, we will often write Recðx; aÞ for
Recðo1; aÞ þ    þ Recðom; aÞ to express that the recipient is willing to receive any object. The cost of an exchange is deﬁned
as the sum of the costs of the two synchronized actions, where c denotes the cost of giving and c0 denotes the cost of receiv-
ing the object.
Finally, Table 4 shows the rules for the choice operators, respectively non-deterministic choice (NC), guarded choice (GC)
and probabilistic choice (PC). B1;B2;B
0
1, and B
0
2 are assumed to be behavioral expressions of the same actor. We write a½B to
express a behavior of an actor a in a given state S.
Intruder. The intruder is modeled similar to any other actor: he is in a certain room, possibly holding some objects.
However, while a regular actor’s behavior is described by a behavioral expression, the intruder is not restricted in this
way. The capabilities of the intruder are given by means of a set of semantical rules, which describe, for instance, that
the intruder can open locks without possession of the key. An example of a set of such semantical intruder rules is given
in Table 5. We consider this particular set of rules as a parameter of our modeling language, which can be replaced by
any stronger or weaker intruder model. The rules in Table 5, describe a more or less realistic, relatively weak, intruder.
Rules LDI , UDI , LOI , UOI express that the intruder can lock and unlock doors and containers without possessing the key.
Rules SI and TI state that the intruder can steal objects from an agent or slip objects into an agent’s pockets. Rules GI and RI
describe the situation where the intruder impersonates a regular agent in the exchange of objects. In addition to these intru-
der-speciﬁc activities, the intruder has the same capabilities as those of regular agents (Tables 2 and 3), such as moving (rule
M) and object manipulation (rules PO, PL, GO, GL, D). The intruder variants of these rules are straightforward and will not be
displayed.
Clearly, the chosen set of intruder capabilities still has some strong limitations. First of all, the intruder’s actions are
restricted to the physical infrastructure provided, which means, e.g., that he will have to use doors to move from one location
to another, that he needs to be in a room to pick up something from that room and that he cannot move an unmovable
object, as he cannot destroy an indestructible object. Second, the intruder is not able to change the physical infrastructure,
so he is not able to create new doors or locations. We repeat that these limitations are not based on the assumption that our
model should only consider relatively weak adversaries and that the semantics rules can be easily extended.4. Security analysis
This section details our approach to analyze STPS security. An overview of the involved steps is depicted in Fig. 1. An STPS
model is mapped to a PRISM program. PRISM programs are recalled in Section 4.1, and the algorithm deﬁning the stepwise
construction of a PRISM program from an STPS model is listed in Section 4.2. The diagram also shows the use of security
template expressions which deﬁne relevant security properties and are instantiated as extended PCTL formulas. Thecite this article in press as: Lenzini G et al. Security analysis of socio-technical physical systems. Comput Electr Eng (2015), http://
.org/10.1016/j.compeleceng.2015.02.019
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The STPS semantic rules – Part 1.
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model, and produces the veriﬁcation result in terms of probability and cost.4.1. PRISM program
A PRISM program is a set of modules, each having a countable set of boolean or integer, local, variables. A module’s local
state is fully deﬁned by the evaluation of its local variables, while the program’s global state is deﬁned by the evaluation of
all variables.
The behavior of a module is deﬁned by a set of probabilistic commands, of Dirac commands, or both. Probabilistic com-
mands have the form ½ag ! p1 : u1 þ . . .þ pm : um, where pi are probabilities (pi 20;1½ and
P
ipi ¼ 1), a is a label, g is a boo-
lean predicate on local and global variables (i.e., a guard), and ui are updates for variables. An update, written asPlease cite this article in press as: Lenzini G et al. Security analysis of socio-technical physical systems. Comput Electr Eng (2015), http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.compeleceng.2015.02.019
Table 4
The STPS semantic rules – Part 3.
NC S½B1  )
ð‘;c;pÞ
S0 B01½ 
S½B1þB2  )
ð‘;c;pÞ
S0 B01½ 
GC
S½B1  )
ð‘;c;pÞ
S0 B01½ sgtS
S½B1þg B2  )
ð‘;c;pÞ
S0 B01½ 
PC S½B1  )
ð‘;c;qÞ
S0 ½B1 
S½B1þpB2  )
ð‘;c;pqÞ
S0 B01½ 
Table 3
The STPS semantic rules – Part 2.
G. Lenzini et al. / Computers and Electrical Engineering xxx (2015) xxx–xxx 7
Please cite this article in press as: Lenzini G et al. Security analysis of socio-technical physical systems. Comput Electr Eng (2015), http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.compeleceng.2015.02.019
Table 5
The STPS semantic rules – Part 4.
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 
&   & v 0k ¼ valk
 
, reassigns variables v i with values vali. The meaning of a probabilistic command is the follow-
ing: for action a, if the guard g is satisﬁed, an update ui is enabled with a probability pi. Dirac commands have the form
½ag ! u, which means that for a, if the guard g is true, the update u is enabled with probability 1. The action a is a label.
The guard is an expression consisting of both local and global variables, and the propositional logic operators.
Syntactically, a module M is delimited by two keywords: the module head ‘‘module M’’, and the module termination
‘‘endmodule’’.
We can model costs in PRISM. In a PRISM program, say P, costs (called rewards in PRISM’s jargon) are speciﬁed in a sepa-
rate module. Syntactically, a reward module R is delimited by keywords ‘‘rewards R’’ and ‘‘endrewards’’. A reward containsPlease cite this article in press as: Lenzini G et al. Security analysis of socio-technical physical systems. Comput Electr Eng (2015), http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.compeleceng.2015.02.019
STPS
Model
PRISM
Program
Security
Templates Expressions
Extended
PCTL
PRISM
Security
Evaluation
Mapping
Using
Instantiating
Input
Input
Output
Fig. 1. Our methodology to evaluate the security of socio-technical physical systems.
Table 6
PRISM variables and their meaning. Unless stated differently,
all variables are boolean. Metavariable a ranges over A; o over
O, and d over D.
Variable Meaning
xo o 2 O
co attrðoÞ ¼ c
mo attrðoÞ ¼ m
do attrðoÞ ¼ d
la (type integer) ðl; aÞ 2 E
lo (type integer) ðl; oÞ 2 E
lI (type integer) ðl; IÞ 2 E
dij ðli;d; ljÞ 2 C
ao ða; oÞ 2 E
oo0 ðo; o0Þ 2 E
Io0 ðI; o0Þ 2 E
Cd lockedDðdÞ
Co lockedOðoÞ
Kdo keyDðdÞ ¼ o
Koo0 keyOðoÞ ¼ o0
G. Lenzini et al. / Computers and Electrical Engineering xxx (2015) xxx–xxx 9one or more reward items, called state reward or transition reward. A state reward has form g : r, where g is guard, and r is an
real-valued algebraic expression on variables and constant. It means that the reward r is associated to any state satisfying g.
A transition reward has the form ½ag : r. It expresses that the transitions labeled a, from states satisfying g, are acquiring the
reward r.
Modules can be composed and they can communicate, for which PRISM uses the composition operators from the process
algebra CSP (e.g., see [23]). Full synchronization of modulesM1, andM2 (on all shared action) is written asM1kM2, their par-
allel interface synchronization, which is limited to the set of shared actions fa; b;   g, is written as M1 j ½a; b;    j M2.
Modules M1 and M2’s interleaving, that is their asynchronous parallel composition, is written as M1k j M2.
4.2. From STPS models to PRISM programs
We encode an STPS model into an equivalent PRISM program. We chose Markov Decision Processes as the PRISM formal-
ism because they conform better to the STPS semantics given by the transition rules deﬁned in Section 3.
The encoding is speciﬁed by ﬁve functions, namelyWA;WO , WL;WI andWC . Given an STPS model S 2 S (S is the set of STPS
models) they return a PRISM program P 2 P (P is the set of PRISM programs). Speciﬁcally, each function maps a fragment of
the STPS model into a PRISMmodule. FunctionWA encodes the actors and the transition rules that have an effect on them.WO
encodes the objects and the transition rules that have an effect on objects. WL encodes the physical space, locations and
doors, and the transition rules affecting them. These three functions together encode the structure which links actors,
objects, locations and doors and the changes that operate on them by the STPS transition rules. Besides,WI encodes the intru-
der and the transition rules of the intruder’s actions, and WC encodes the transition costs. The ﬁnal PRISM program is the
composition, by synchronization, of the ﬁve modules. Our mapping models locations l 2 L as integers and assumes the set
of PRISM variables given in Table 6.
The function WA, which produces the suitable PRISM commands related to the actors, is presented in Listing 1. There is a
command for each transition rule whose conclusion refers to actors. The action labels of each command correspond to labels
of STPS transitions. For instance, the PRISM command’s label Ma;dij corresponds to the STPS model’s transition label
movingaðd; li; ljÞ (line 3). The guard of the command depends on the premise of the transition rule that corresponds to the
command. The updates express the conclusions of the transition rule.
So, for instance, transition rule M in Table 2, whose premises are ða; liÞ and ðli; d; ljÞ (implicitly from the edges) and
d½:lockedDðdÞ (explicitly stated), maps to guard ðla ¼ iÞ ^ dij ^ :Cd. Its conclusion, ða; ljÞ, maps to update l0a ¼ j. To takePlease cite this article in press as: Lenzini G et al. Security analysis of socio-technical physical systems. Comput Electr Eng (2015), http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.compeleceng.2015.02.019
Listing 1. Generating the actors modules.
Listing 2. Generating the objects modules.
10 G. Lenzini et al. / Computers and Electrical Engineering xxx (2015) xxx–xxxanother example, transition rule LD in Table 2, whose premises are ða; liÞ; ða; kÞ and ðli; d; ljÞ (implicitly from the edges) and
d½:lockedDðdÞ and keyDðdÞ ¼ k (explicitly stated), maps to guard ðla ¼ iÞ ^ ak ^dij ^ :Cd ^ Kdk. The rule’s conclusion, its part
concerning the actor, is empty so it maps to the neutral update l0a ¼ i, which changes nothing. The mapping concerning
the part of the rule’s conclusion that relates to the change of status of the door, from unlocked to locked, is speciﬁed in WL.
In Listing 1 we use the function } that adds a boolean to the guard of a command, for example:
g0}½ag ! u  ½ag ^ g0 ! u. This is used for the commands related to the guarded and probabilistic choices (line 16 and line
17, respectively).
The function WO shown in Listing 2 generates the commands of the objects modules. These commands express the
objects’ behaviors described in the conclusions of STA rules. The variable lo is of type integer describing the location of
the object o that is initialised by its ﬁrst location and xo is a boolean expressing the existence of the object o. Also, thePlease cite this article in press as: Lenzini G et al. Security analysis of socio-technical physical systems. Comput Electr Eng (2015), http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.compeleceng.2015.02.019
Listing 3. Generating the objects modules.
Listing 4. Generating the costs modules.
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similar ones obtained by WA.
The function WL presented in Listing 3 produces the PRISM commands related to the status of doors. The boolean propo-
sition Cdij shows if the door dij between locations i and j is locked or not.
The functionWC deﬁned in Listing 4 produces the cost commands by calling the function Cost. The command in line 3 is a
generic command that returns the cost related to the action a where ga is the guard to execute a.
4.3. Security properties
Since the scope of our formalization is to verify socio-technical security properties on STPS models, we comment in this
section what properties can be of relevance and how to express them in such a way that they can be checked by running
PRISM. A formalism that is able to express all the factors that our STPS models describe, that is paths along locations, paths
of actions, propositions on state variables, probabilities of occurrence of events and of sequences of events, and their costs is
the extended PCTL [10]. Formulas / in such a logic are generated by the following BNF grammar:Please
dx.doi/ ::¼ >japj/ ^ /j:/jPﬄp½wjRﬄr ½F/
w ::¼ X/j/U/j/U6k/Here, k 2 N; r 2 Rþ; p 2 ½0;1, and ﬄ2 f<;6; >;Pg. A state formula can be ‘‘ap’’, an atomic proposition, or any propositional
expression built from ‘‘ap’’. Pﬄp½w, called probabilistic path predicate, returns true if the probability to satisfy the path formula
w isﬄ p. The cost predicate Rﬄr½/ returns true if the cost to satisfy / isﬄ r. Here, F is the temporal logic operator eventually. A
path formula is built from the typical temporal operators next (X), until (U), and bounded until (U6k). As usual, other logic
operators can be derived from the basic operators. Namely:
 ? :>;/ _ /0  :ð:/ ^ :/0Þ;/! /0  :/ _ /0, and /$ /0  /! /0 ^ /0 ! /.
 F/  >U/; F6k/  >U6k/;G/  :ðF:/Þ, and G6k/  :ðF6k:/Þ where k 2 N.
 PPp½G/  P61p½F:/.
Besides, the extended PCTL has two more probabilistic operators, Pmin and Pmax, and two more cost operators, Rmin and
Rmax. These operators can be used within a path or a state formulas to express the minimum (resp. maximum) probability
or cost.
In order to simplify the speciﬁcation of STPS requirements, we deﬁne three PCTL expression templates. Assuming that r is
a predicate logic expression built from three atomic propositions, namely: ðaoÞ (i.e., agents a holds object o), ðla ¼ iÞ (i.e.,
agent a is in location i), and ðlo ¼ iÞ (i.e., object o is in location i), we deﬁne:
1. / :¼ Fr.
2. /0 :¼ Rmin½/.
3. /00 :¼ Pmax½/.
Using the templates we can express reachability properties in a socio-technical sense, such as the property that even-
tually an object is found in a location, that an actor, or the intruder, reaches a room, or that he will get in possession of
an object. They can be used to check for possibility of intrusions or of thefts. The quantitative expressions /0 and /00 are used
to quantify, in term of minimal cost and maximum probability, a security property. We show how to use such properties in
the next section where we develop a proof-of-concept use case.cite this article in press as: Lenzini G et al. Security analysis of socio-technical physical systems. Comput Electr Eng (2015), http://
.org/10.1016/j.compeleceng.2015.02.019
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Let ‘E’ be the name of a building in a small institution. At lunch time, the ’E’ building’s workers leave their ofﬁce doors
open or closed, but without locking them. There are no policies or security primitives that enforce them to lock doors
and to prevent security incidents from insiders. Further, the ‘E’ building has two gates to enter or exit, which are always open
from 6 am to 6 pm. During this time, no access card/key is needed to enter the building. Under these assumptions, we use our
framework to measure the probability and the cost to get access to an unauthorized location and to steal objects by an intru-
der. The building’s infrastructure is depicted in Fig. 2. It has nine locations, labeled l0;    ; l8, where l8 denotes outside the
building. Doors d08 and d18 are the entry/exit points to/from the building that connect l0 with l8 and l1 with l8, respectively.
We consider at least two mobile objects o1 and o2 located in l2 and l6, respectively.5.1. Formal model
First, we develop the infrastructure tree, and we describe the behavior of an actor a. Then, we show the generated PRISM
code for the actor, the intruder, and the objects. Fig. 3 captures part of the graph model of the infrastructure shown in Fig. 2.
It shows the initial values of the actor a, the intruder I, and the objects o1 and o2. The behavior of a is expressed as follows:
MoveToðd08; l8; l0Þ  MoveToðd02; l0; l2Þ  Getðo1; l2Þ  MoveToðd25; l2; l5Þ  MoveToðd56; l5; l6Þ  Putðo1; l6Þ  Getðo2; l6Þ  MoveTo
ðd65; l6; l5Þ MoveToðd52; l5; l2Þ MoveToðd20; l2; l0Þ MoveToðd08; l0; l8Þ.5.2. PRISM model
For the performance assessment of the system, the whole system is encoded into PRISM; and Listing 5 shows the code
fragment for the actor a, the intruder I, both objects o1 and o2, and the cost module. In Listing 5, the module ‘‘Actora’’ (lines
25–40) describes the behavior of the actor a and the module ‘‘Intruder’’ (lines 3–23) describes the behavior of the intruder.
To add more actors, a user instantiates the module ‘‘Actora’’ by renaming only the actor’s local variables. Also, the modules
‘‘Objecto1 ’’ (lines 41–47) and ‘‘Objecto2 ’’ (lines 48–54) describe the behaviors of objects ‘‘o1’’ and ‘‘o2’’, respectively. The mod-
ule ‘‘Cost’’ (lines 55–60) assigns the cost to the actions. In the module ‘‘Intruder’’, the probabilistic command in line 7 deﬁnes
the behavior of the intruder when he is outside the building and the set of commands in lines 9–14 describe the possible
moving actions when he is in the location l4. In addition, lines 16–22 deﬁne two actions, take and put an object, respectively.
For the objects o1 and o2, the commands in lines 43, 44, 50, and 51 describe the moving of objects, otherwise they stay at the
same locations (lines 45, 46, 52, and 53). Finally, the module ‘‘cost’’ deﬁnes the cost to access to location l2 (line 57), to pos-
sess an object (lines 58 and 59) by a possessor, and the cost to possess an object by the intruder. Otherwise, the cost in line 56
attributes the value 1 to any other action (see Listing 6).5.3. Speciﬁcation and veriﬁcation of properties
In order to validate the functionality of the speciﬁed system, we verify four security properties, which are instantiations of
the templates developed in Section 4.3.l0l2l3
l6l5l4
l1 l7
d81
d08
Fig. 2. Floor plan of the infrastructure.
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El2 l6l0l8l1
o1 a o2I
d08d18
Fig. 3. The infrastructure model.
Listing 5. The PRISM code fragment of the system.
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14 G. Lenzini et al. / Computers and Electrical Engineering xxx (2015) xxx–xxxProperty 1. What is the maximum probability for the intruder I to possess both objects o1 and o2?’’ This property is instantiated
from /00 and expressed as follows: Pmax ¼ ?½>U 6 stepðlo2 ¼ l8Þ&ðlo1 ¼ l8Þ&ðIo1 Þ&ðIo2 Þ. The variable step is the number of steps to
reach the state that satisﬁes: ðlo2 ¼ l8Þ&ðlo1 ¼ l8Þ&ðIo1 Þ&ðIo2 Þ where the propositions lo1 ¼ l8 and lo2 ¼ l8 mean that both objects
are outside the building. The propositions Io1 and Io2 show that the intruder possesses both objects. The veriﬁcation result of this
property is presented by Fig. 4. It shows the convergence of the probability evaluation of Property 1 from 0 at step 11 to 0.026
after 28 steps, then it increases up to 1 after 50 steps. This result shows that the opportunity to steal an object is increasing
while the intruder is in the building.Property 2. This property measures the minimum cost to get the object o1 from any location in the building and it is expressed
from the formula /0 by: Rmin ¼ ?½FIo1flI ¼ ig where lI ¼ i means the initial location of the intruder. After veriﬁcation, Fig. 5 shows
that the cost obtained from the satisﬁability of Property 2 is 9 from locations l4 and l6, and 3 from locations l2 and l3, and 4 from l7
and l8. From this result, we observe that the cost increases more when the intruder is far from the object location.Property 3. This property evaluates the minimum cost to get the object o1 and go outside the building. Similarly to Property 2, it is
instantiated from /0 and it is expressed by: Rmin ¼ ?½FðIo1&lI ¼ 8ÞflI ¼ ig. The veriﬁcation results depicted in Fig. 6 show that the
reward obtained from the satisﬁability of Property 3 is 240 for locations l2;    ; l7, 24 for l1, and 0 for l0 and l8. The obtained results
show the highest cost needed to possess an object and going outside the building from a given location.Please cite this article in press as: Lenzini G et al. Security analysis of socio-technical physical systems. Comput Electr Eng (2015), http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.compeleceng.2015.02.019
Fig. 5. The veriﬁcation result of Property 2.
Fig. 6. The veriﬁcation result of Property 3.
Fig. 4. The veriﬁcation result of Property 1.
G. Lenzini et al. / Computers and Electrical Engineering xxx (2015) xxx–xxx 15Property 4. What is the maximum probability to possess an object by either an actor or the intruder at any location?’’ This prop-
erty is instantiated from /00 and expressed by: Pmax ¼ ?½>U 6 stepððIo2&ao1 Þ _ ðIo1&ao2 ÞÞ. Fig. 7 shows that the probability results
of this property converges to 1 after 55 steps. We observe that the probability to possess an object is close to one for both the actor
and intruder, since they stay at the building.Please cite this article in press as: Lenzini G et al. Security analysis of socio-technical physical systems. Comput Electr Eng (2015), http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.compeleceng.2015.02.019
Fig. 7. The results of Property 4.
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We have deﬁned a framework for automatic security analysis of socio-technical physical systems. Our formalism models
aspects of a socio-technical physical space such as its spatial infrastructure, its objects – among which doors, locking keys,
containers and assets–, and agents that move across the infrastructure and manipulate objects. Actions have a cost and deci-
sions are guided by probabilities or by contextual conditions. The semantics is rich and allows to express security properties
about whether attacks exist with maximal likelihood and minimal cost. These security properties can be veriﬁed automati-
cally. We map our model to the speciﬁcation language of the probabilistic model checker PRISM, and express our security
properties in the Probabilistic Computational Tree Logic, which can be processed by PRISM. The effectiveness and efﬁciency
of our approach is illustrated with a simple case study.
The work done has been conceived to allow several further developments. We plan to extend our model with information,
allowing for the modeling of digital objects and knowledge. This would make our model richer, able to express socio-technical
physical and information systems. Our notion of intruder will be also extended with capabilities mirroring actions docu-
mented in social-engineering and incidents reports. Further, we plan to develop a security policy language, in order to enrich
our framework with security policies. From a more theoretical point of view, we plan to develop correctness and soundness
proofs of our mapping functions. Finally, we intend to implement the framework as a software tool that fully supports all
steps in the design and analysis of socio-technical physical systems.
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